The State of Utah v. Simone Lucia Kent : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
The State of Utah v. Simone Lucia Kent : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Apellee.
Linda M. Jones; Judith A. Jensen; Salt Lake Legal defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
LINDA M. JONES, #5497 JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603 SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER
ASSOC. 424 East 500 South, Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM ATTORNEY GENERAL LAURA B. DUPAIX ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL Heber M. Wells Building 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor P. 0. Box 140854 Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114-0854 Attorneys for Appellee
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Kent, No. 960606 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/449
KFU 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 60 




THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SIMONE LUCIA KENT, 
Defendant/Appellant 
DOCKET NO. «3i 
Case No. 960606-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Computer 
Crimes, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996), in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert K. 
Hilder, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES, #5497 
JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. 0. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
JUN 1 9 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SIMONE LUCIA KENT, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 960606-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Computer 
Crimes, a 2nd degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-703 (Supp. 1996), in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert K. 
Hilder, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES, #5497 
JUDITH A. JENSEN, #4603 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 
SINCE THE CONDUCT ALLEGED HERE MAY BE CHARGED 
UNDER THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE OR THE OTHER 
FRAUD PROVISIONS, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO ORDER THE STATE TO PROCEED UNDER THE 
STATUTE CARRYING THE LESS SEVERE PENALTY. . . . . 2 
A. THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE AND OTHER 
FRAUD-BASED STATUTES SHARE ELEMENTS 6 
1. The Forgery and Computer Crimes 
Statutes. 7 
2. The Conduct Charged in the 
Information Is Subject to Different 
Penalties Under the Specific Provisions 
of the Insurance Fraud Statute and 
Computer Crimes Statute. 11 
3. The State Acknowledges that the 
Computer Crimes and Communications 
Fraud Statutes Proscribe Related 
Conduct. 13 
B. THE STATE HAS MISCONSTRUED KENT'S 
DISCUSSION CONCERNING STATE V. BRYAN. . . . 15 
C. THE STATE'S "SPECIFIC CONDUCT" ARGUMENT 
IS UNPERSUASIVE 16 
1. State v. Clark Is Inapposite. . . . 16 
2. The State's "Reasonable Basis" 
Argument Is Insupportable. 18 
3. The State Mischaracterizes the 
"Factual Record." 23 
CONCLUSION 25 
Addendum A: Legislative debates relating to enactment of the 
Computer Crimes statute 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Camp v. Office of Recovery Services of Utah 
Dept. of Social Services, 779 P.2d 242 
(Utah App. 1989) 8, 9 
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 
1993) 22 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 5 
State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 11, 
12, 13, 15, 
16, 18 
State v. Clark. 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981) 16, 17, 19 
State v. Duran. 772 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1989) 6, 17 
State v. Fair, 456 P.2d 168 (Utah 1969) 3 
State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747 (Utah 1986) 5, 16, 17 
State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1982) 17 
State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978) . . . . 3, 4, 11, 
12, 13, 18 
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) 12, 13, 18 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) 23 
State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) . . . . 1, 2, 5, 6, 
7, 11, 12, 
13, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 
22 
State v. Twitchell, 333 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1959) 4 
State v. Voat, 824 P.2d 455 (Utah App. 1991) 6 
Utah Dep't of Social Services v. Higley, 810 
P. 2d 436 (Utah App. 1991) 9 
ii 
Page 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1995) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (Supp. 1996) 8, 10, 17, 
20 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521(1) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-701, et sea. (1995 
and Supp. 1996) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3) (Supp. 1996) 6, 10, 13, 
24 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1995) 13, 14, 17, 
20 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SIMONE LUCIA KENT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960606-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant Simone Kent ("Kent") maintains that in the context 
of this case, the Computer Crimes statute and those statutes 
proscribing Forgery, Insurance Fraud, and Communications Fraud 
are written so that the exact same conduct is subject to 
different penalties depending upon which offense the prosecutor 
chooses to charge. Thus, Kent is entitled to have her case 
proceed under the statute carrying the less severe penalty. State 
v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969). 
In response, the state disregards whether the conduct is 
subject to different penalties, and advocates for a stringent 
inquiry considering only whether the statutes contain "wholly 
duplicative" elements. (State's Brief ("S.B.") at 6-15.) Such a 
rigid inquiry has not been sanctioned by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In addition, the state's analysis under the stringent in-
quiry is incorrect. The state strains to distinguish the Computer 
Crimes statute from the other provisions. (S.B. at 6-15.) It in-
correctly claims a clarifying amendment to the Forgery statute is 
inapplicable here; the Insurance Fraud statute contains a false-
representation element that is not in the Computer Crimes 
statute; and the Communications Fraud statute contains a communi-
cation element that is not necessary in proving a violation of 
the Computer Crimes statute. Finally, the state concludes that 
the conduct alleged is not subject to differing penalties. The 
state's arguments are unpersuasive, as set forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
SINCE THE CONDUCT ALLEGED HERE MAY BE CHARGED UNDER THE 
COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE OR THE OTHER FRAUD PROVISIONS, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ORDER THE STATE TO PROCEED 
UNDER THE STATUTE CARRYING THE LESS SEVERE PENALTY. 
The state applies a rigid analysis to the issue raised in 
this case: "The test for determining whether two statutes 
proscribe the same conduct is whether the 'two statutes are 
wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime.' [State v. 
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985).]" (S.B. at 7.) Such a 
strict inquiry fails to take into consideration the 
constitutional doctrines implicated in the Shondel rule: 
The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime 
should be sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary 
intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how to 
conduct themselves in conformity with it. A fair and 
logical concomitant of that rule is that such a penal 
statute should be similarly clear, specific and 
understandable as to the penalty imposed for its violation. 
Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule that 
where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two 
punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is 
entitled to the benefit of the lesser. 
Id. at 148 (emphasis added) . 
Shondel and its Utah Supreme Court progeny are grounded in 
the proposition that where the same facts may be used in 
prosecutions under two completely integrated statutes, e.g. a 
misdemeanor statute and a felony statute, the state must proceed 
2 
under the misdemeanor statute. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. The equal 
protection doctrine supports the rule. 
Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all 
those who are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal 
laws must be written so that there are significant 
differences between offenses and so that the exact same 
conduct is not subject to different penalties depending uvon 
which of two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to 
charge. To allow that would be to allow a form of 
arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law. The 
Legislature may make automobile homicide which is committed 
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot 
make the crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the 
choice to the prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony 
or a misdemeanor. 
Because a "reckless" defendant could, for the same 
behavior, be charged under either statute, the statutes give 
a prosecutor impermissible discretion to choose a 
defendant's penalty based upon which statute the prosecutor 
chooses to charge under. 
Id. (emphasis added); State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575, 576 (Utah 
1978) ("when there are two statutes as here which prohibit the 
same conduct but impose different penalties, [defendant] is 
entitled to the lesser penalty"); State v. Fair, 456 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1969) (an act subject to two legislative fiats, one of 
which would penalize the accused as a misdemeanant and the other 
as a felon, gives the accused the benefit of being accountable 
only for the lesser of the two penalties). 
Utah Supreme Court precedent does not support limiting the 
query to the state's rigid "wholly duplicative" analysis. In 
Loveless, the defendant was convicted of a first degree felony, 
aggravated sexual assault, which simply proscribed having sex 
with a person under 14 years of age. On appeal defendant argued 
the state should have been required to proceed under the rape 
3 
statute, which made it a second degree felony to have sexual 
intercourse with a female, "not [defendant's] wife, without her 
consent." Loveless, 581 P.2d at 576. The Utah Supreme Court 
agreed with defendant, reversing the case. Id. at 577. The 
"wholly duplicative" analysis did not apply in the rigid fashion 
advanced by the state here. The court determined where conduct 
was proscribed by two statutes, defendant was entitled to have 
the state proceed under the statute carrying the lesser penalty. 
After Loveless came Bryan. There defendant was accused of 
driving at approximately 50 miles per hour while intoxicated 
through a red light and into the victims' automobile, causing 
their deaths. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 259. The state charged 
defendant with felony manslaughter. Defendant argued that the 
charge should be reduced to automobile homicide, or in the 
alternative to misdemeanor negligent homicide. The Utah Supreme 
Court reiterated that the reduction rule was based on the concept 
that defendant would be denied equal protection of the laws "'if 
the same identical facts may be used in prosecutions under two 
completely integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the other a 
felony.'" Id. at 261 (quoting. State v. Twitchell, 333 P. 2d 
1075, 1077 (Utah 1959) (emphasis in original)). 
The Utah Supreme Court then recognized that manslaughter "is 
committed when one ' [r]ecklessly causes the death of another,'" 
and negligent homicide occurs "[w]hen the death of any person 
ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received 
by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety 
4 
of others." Id. at 263. Notwithstanding any perceived difference 
in the statutes, the Utah Supreme Court found the provisions were 
"the same" requiring the state to proceed under the statute 
carrying the less severe penalty. Id. "[W]e cannot disregard our 
responsibility to assure the rational and evenhanded application 
of the criminal laws." Id. 
By advocating a rigid "wholly duplicative" analysis, the 
state is elevating an incidental statement in Bryan, 709 P.2d at 
263 ("We held in [Shondel] that if two statutes are wholly 
duplicative as to the elements of the crime, the law does not 
permit a prosecutor to exercise the wholly unfettered authority 
to decide whether the crime should be charged as a misdemeanor or 
a felony"), over constitutional considerations and the 
responsibility of the court to assure rational and evenhanded 
application of criminal laws. 
After Brvanf the Utah Supreme Court continued to apply the 
analysis based in constitutional doctrines without reliance or 
emphasis on the "wholly duplicative" language. 
The analytical framework for evaluating the defendants' 
claim is set out in [Bryan], 
[T]he criminal laws must be written so that there are 
significant differences between offenses and so that 
the exact same conduct is not subject to different 
penalties depending on which of two statutory sections 
a prosecutor chooses to charge. To allow that would be 
to allow a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our 
system of law. 
Thus, in the present case, the question is whether the two 
statutes at issue proscribe exactly the same conduct, i.e. 
do they contain the same elements? 
State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986); State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 481 (Utah 1988) (statutes do not "overlap"); but 
5 
see. State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App. 1991) (repre-
senting that subsequent lfcases^ "indicate" that in order for 
Shondel to apply, statutes must by "wholly duplicative as to the 
elements of the crime," then citing only to Bryan); State v. 
Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989) (asserting that appli-
cation of Shondel is limited to situations where elements of 
statutes are "wholly duplicative").1 
In this case the relevant query is whether two separate 
statutes apply to the same facts. Kent maintains that the conduct 
alleged in this case is subject to different penalties depending 
upon which offense the prosecutor chooses to charge, as set forth 
in Appellant's Brief. The result is the same under the state's 
analysis. 
A. THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE AND OTHER FRAUD-BASED 
STATUTES SHARE ELEMENTS. 
The state asserts the Computer Crimes statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-703(3) (Supp. 1996),2 requires proof of the 
following elements: 
1) [A] person must use or knowingly allow another person to 
use a computer or computer system 2) to devise or execute an 
artifice or scheme 3) to defraud or obtain money, services, 
property, or something of value, 4) by false pretenses, 
promises, or representations. 
(S.B. at 8-9.) It also asserts the statute "does not proscribe 
1
 Kent does not dispute that the rule articulated in Shondel 
applies when the elements of two separate statutes are wholly 
duplicative. See Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. However, Shondel is not 
limited in application to that context. 
2
 The state relies on an April 1995 version of the statute. In 
May 1995, amendments that are irrelevant here went into effect. 
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the same conduct as the forgery, insurance fraud, and the com-
munications fraud statutes." (S.B. at 4.) Kent addresses the 
state's arguments with respect to each statute, as set forth 
below. 
1. The Forgery and Computer Crimes Statutes. 
According to the state, "the elements of forgery relevant to 
this case are that one must 1) with intent to defraud 2) [make, 
complete, execute, or] utter a writing 3) so that [it] purports 
to be that of another or purports to have been executed at a time 
or place in numbered sequence other than was in fact the case." 
(S.B. at 9 (citing Section § 76-6-501 (1) (b) (1995)).) Shondel 
applies since the conduct alleged here is subject to penalty 
under both the Computer Crimes statute and the Forgery statute. 
Allegedly, Kent with intent to defraud executed, completed, or 
made a computer transmission so that it purported to be a claim 
of another, Cathleen Gullett, for payment. (R. 1-3; 47-48.) 
The state argues that the Forgery statute is inapplicable 
here on the basis that it requires proof that defendant made, 
completed, executed or uttered a "writing."3 According to the 
state, a "writing" is not a computer alteration, entry or 
3
 The first Forgery element is "to defraud," as set forth in 
element 3 of the Computer Crimes Statute. The statutes share that 
element. In addition, the statutes both proscribe the making of 
false representations. 
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transmission. Yet, under the Forgery statute, the legislature 
has defined "writing" as such. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) 
(Supp. 1996). The state regards the definition inapplicable. 
It asserts that when Kent was charged in November 1995 with 
the Computer Crimes offense, the term "writing" was defined to 
"include [] printing or any other method of recording information, 
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right privilege, or 
identification." (S.B. at 9 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
501(2) (1995)).) In 1996 the legislature amended the definition 
of "writing" to "include[] printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method" of recording information. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (Supp. 1996). The amendment simply 
clarifies the definition: A "writing" includes computer generated 
information. Retroactive application of the amendment is 
supported by the following cases. 
In Camp v. Office of Recovery Services of Utah Dept. of 
Social Services, 779 P.2d 242 (Utah App. 1989), plaintiff's 
daughter was a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident, 
which caused the daughter's death. Before her death, the daughter 
incurred $39,000 in medical expenses. Plaintiff filed for finan-
cial assistance to cover the expenses. After plaintiff was ini-
tially denied assistance, she retained counsel, wrote a demand 
letter to the insurance carrier for the driver of the vehicle, 
settled with the insurance carrier and reapplied for the assis-
tance. Plaintiff was found eligible for assistance and reimbursed 
8 
1 -: - - r.-M ...::: :x • - J . = . ;::J „ .1 d , d I ,:1 'I .3 4 4 . 
When the state learned of plaintiff's settlement with the 
insurance carrier * souaht reimbursement The trial court found 
- - ^ avor :^. i. ...aii^-ii -=.:..: :.:.:- . tate appealed. Id. at 243 44, 
According + c * he statute :. r: effect at the time of the matter a 
Derson seekir.n stace financial assistance was prohibj ted from 
ix^ing a _ c . \ or commencing an action against a thiid party for 
recovery of medical costs for _•.:: injury. 
* " " "^pri"d ana new words were added 
to ^ilcoL Li.ai a ^xouii oc^jvii^ dbsistance was prohibited from 
filing a clair-. commencing an action or sr-:~.ling, compromising, 
is,.. • . : - * : ' r y 
M medical costs YUc- amended defu^i L^L ^ L ,:eu Ldtioa^i.ve^y 
"[biased on the rule ths ne original act musr be compared 
original act the legislature intended remedy . ^ 46 
-
 :
 Utah Dep't of Social Services v. Higley, 81 G -.2d 43 6, 438 
A:
 : - - * ' - ^ •* > - i 
merely intended Lu clarify trie statute .; ,,iciei t encompass all 
claim resolution^ _ : *_ : at 24f n I' 
o aii ~- •:_ h~ _^, --- - «— ^  ^—- f-^- - ^ > ^ 1'V - -^ '^- —' _2. J. t^ - j -•- e \ t 
reiterated that ne^ wci as added tr ~ statute merely serve to 
clarify the statute. Such an amendment is not substantive, 
ye i. • i e . _• -* [::: 1 ii ca t : i oi l • :: f 11 le s t a11 11e H i g l e y 8 II 0 
P. 2a at 43 8. i-Viere amendments clar ify or amplify how the earlier 
] iw should ha-'e be^r understood., they are remedial in nature and 
di ^  - hat the 1 a\ i :i :: es n Dt appl y 
9 
retroactively. 
In this case, the amendment provides clarification. The 
former version of the Forgery statute defining "writing" 
contemplated "any" "method of recording" or storing information. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (1995). The amendment merely makes 
the implicit explicit by specifically articulating electronic 
storage and transmission as a form of "writing." 
Where an amendment merely adopts language in furtherance of 
the apparent legislative intent, the amended definition is 
retroactively applied. Since element 2 of the Forgery statute 
proscribes use of a computer in making the false representations 
or perpetrating the fraud, for purposes of this case, the Forgery 
and Computer Crimes contain the same elements. 
The state also asserts that forgery requires that the 
writing "purport to be that of another" (S.B. at 9-10), and that 
the Computer Crimes statute has no such requirement. That is 
incorrect. The Computer Crimes statute proscribes false 
pretenses, promises and representations, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
703(3) (Supp. 1996), which is the equivalent of engaging in 
conduct purporting to be that of another. In addition, in this 
case, Kent was charged with completing an electronic transmission 
purporting to be a claim of another, "Cathleen Gullett," for 
payment. 
Since the conduct alleged in this action violates both the 
Forgery and Computer Crimes statutes, and those statutes contain 
the same elements in this context, the trial court erred in 
10 
failing ^ - require the state to proceed against Kent under the 
statute carry ir.tr * - >^^- v penalty, Bryan, 7n"i !?l '"'I ,i! ~'"^ ; 
bnonae^ , ±. , .,..,, Loveless, 581 l".2d 575, 576. 
2 , The Conduct Charcred in the Information Is Subject to 
Different Penalties Under the Specific Provisions of the 
Insurance Fraud Statute and Computer Crimes Statute. 
The state asserts that to commit insurance fraud "one must 
. tr the intent :o defraud L present - cause *o be presented 
a cj-aim for payment. ..y .rcher benefiu ^ c.,:.suant to an insurance 
policy, certificate or contract, 5 '« knowing that * he 
repi esen: r. ;.• • :/ ,....-: fa.st ' 
concerning any material fact or th^ng to -.-*e claim " iS.E. at 
(citing Utah rode Ann. S '"'6-6--521 ' : " Vgai^. the conduct 
state's definition That is sufficient basis for reversing the 
t r i a 1 cour t' s r u 1 i n c? in t h is c .=» ° e ^ ^  t -^ e m ar ^ d i n q t he matter 
o> J- - it. roirn nty ' pro toed , . t .surance Fraud 
statue. Shondel, 453 P,2d 146, 148/ Loveless, 58] P.2d 575, 576; 
Brya: "'' ^ P*2d at ?f? "r -" chara: ntr ravels stated, 
un Ndiuii j./, 1995/ FBi special Agent v%t bcepr. .. .\mttie 
received information from Leslie Warner of th-- First Health 
security department, ' Salt Lake City, Utah, that possible 
computerized fraud had occurred in their insurance claim 
system, and that two unauthorized checks for $3,500 and 
• $7,500 had been sent from,, their office to a post office box 
located in West Valley City, UT. in the name of Cathleen 
Gullett. The defendant was identified as the operator of 
the terminal from, which the unauthorized, checks had been 
issued. 
) 
The state asserts that the i n s u r a n c e Fraud statute, is not 
11 
applicable here since it "target[s] different criminal conduct 
[than the Computer Crimes statute]. The computer crimes statute 
proscribes the use of a computer to defraud anyone else. The 
insurance fraud statute on the other hand aims to punish those 
who file false claims with insurance companies pursuant to 
insurance policies or contracts." (S.B. at 13.) 
Inasmuch as the Information in this case alleged defrauding 
an insurance claim system and using a computer in the process, 
this case presents a unique situation in that the state had the 
choice of targeting one aspect of the offense over the other, 
depending upon which offense the prosecutor chose to charge. 
Leaving the prosecutor with the "choice" implicates equal 
protection and due process concerns. Shondel 453 P.2d at 148; 
Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. 
In one case, the prosecutor may choose to focus on the means 
used to perpetrate the fraud against an insurance claims system, 
and charge under the Computer Crimes statute, as in Kent's case. 
The defendant is charged with a second degree felony. In an 
identical case, the prosecutor may choose to focus on the victim, 
and charge under the Insurance Fraud statute. The defendant is 
charged with a third degree felony. The prosecutor's classifica-
tion of the defendants is arbitrary and standardless, resulting 
in disparate treatment. Shondel, Loveless, and Bryan prohibit 
that form of classification. See also State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 
991, 998 (Utah 1995) (leaving the choice to the prosecutor is 
arbitrary and standardless under state constitution). 
Since both statutes "specifically" target conduct alleged in 
12 
the Information filed against Kent,, leaving the prosecutor with 
the choice to proceed under the statute carrying the harsher 
:
 - - ,.=- ^ nondel , 153 I > 2d < 
Loveless, :>81 r„2d C*L - •.; Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263 Where the 
prosecutor is faced with a choi ce, the trial court must proceed 
w i t h t h e in a 11 s i i :i n d e i !:  1 i = s t a 11 11 • s < 11 i e 1 e s s s e v e i: e 
penalty. Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148; Loveless, 581 P.2d at 577; 
Bryan, 7 0 9 P. 2d at 2 63; see also Mohi, 901 P.. 2d at: 991 (allowing 
pro.secuti H I <>,« cxeii: ise - - . • „:i i ig w:i tl IOI it sufficient 
distinctions is violative of the uniform operation of the '. aws 
provision 
3. The State Acknowledges LIICLL Liie Computer Crimes and 
Communications Fraud Statutes Proscribe Related Conduct. 
•::. -- ...• Fraud ir.a:./..'.: * Lso applies to penalize 
the conduct alleged :. n ch.i s case. 
A person is guilty of communications fraud if he or she has 
L.1J devised any scheme or artifice [2] to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property or anything of value 
[3] by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises ox material omissions, and * .v 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person [5] by 
any means [6] for the purpose of executincr "v- m n r p a l i n n r-hp> 
scheme or artifice, 
(S.B. at 14 (citing Utah Code Ann. §76-10-16"" > 
4
 The state also asserts that the Computer Cr 1 m e S SLaLuL.c va LJ c: ^D 
not require proof that a false representation has been made in 
support of a claim for payment pursuant to an insurance policy. 
"Indeed, a computer crime does not require any representation at 
all*n (S.B. at 13.) That assertion is inaccurate. The Computer 
Crimes statute specifically proscribes the use of false 
representations in devising a scheme or artifice to obtain money, 
property or other thing of value. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3) 
(Supp. 1996). 
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state acknowledges that the Communications Fraud statute and 
Computer Crimes statute share elements and the Communications 
Fraud statute proscribes perpetrating the fraud via use of 
computer. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6); (S.B. at 13-14). 
Notwithstanding the duplications in elements, the state 
relies on the rigid "wholly duplicative" analysis to assert the 
communications fraud statute "requires a direct or indirect 
communication with a person for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme to defraud another. In contrast, the com-
puter crimes statute does not require any communication. A person 
can commit a computer crime without communicating anything to 
anyone." (S.B. at 14.) The state's assertion is irrational. Kent 
allegedly used a computer system to execute and conceal the 
scheme by directly or indirectly communicating the claim to 
someone authorizing payment. According to the state, a computer 
is used to commit such a crime for the purpose of executing and 
concealing the fraudulent scheme through the in/direct 
communication. "Using a computer to steal or defraud is easy to 
do and extremely difficult to detect." (S.B. at 24.) The computer 
allegedly facilitates concealing the scheme through direct or 
indirect communication. 
In this instance, the state's examples further illustrate 
the overlap of the statutes. According to the state, a person may 
be in violation of the Computer Crimes statute by accessing a 
computer system and "alter [ing] existing information to reflect 
that payment had been made on a debt, or one could simply direct 
14 
a computer by altering existing information to issue checks rv 
something else of value Lu cna*" r- e 
alteration examples reflect the execution ;^. a scheme with an 
intent :. aef: =i.;:i i; means cf misrepresentations made via 
computer f - •• ' . • ^.- • •-— 
of ,is ,uu.,, :,iie wttenses aie indistinguishable. Because the 
Communications Fraud and Computer Crimes statutes share the same 
• ' . - • • ->- - :i n • -d w :i t:l i til :t i s 
matter under the statute carrying the less severe penalty. 
B -5 STATE HAS MISCONSTRUED KENT'S DISCUSSION CONCERNING 
STATE V. BRYAN', 
. : rier o p e n i n g b r i e f , Kent- d id no*- a r^u^ t h e f o ] :^winq 
~pr.cz : . -.= - • . ; ^ : i^e the 
requisite memai culpability for forgery, .nsurance fraud, and 
communications fraud equals or exceeds rb^ ^^nta" ' ulrahi"! ^ ~ v 
• ' - ! • - • • -- • _ . i:..rt i^..J to 
sentence [Kentj : - - :.- lesser penalty prescribed b\ tne other 
statutes " 'c u af l^ -l^ ' -a*-her Kent rids reiiea on Bryan. "^9 
, .„.. .^j...... ...;. ...--. ,.v A*...,g proposition: The lorgery, 
Insurance Fraud and Communications Fraud sratutes appear to 
require proof of mental culpability that is equal to or greater 
...-1 .. i - 'established to prove a violation of the 
Computer Crimes statute. Any perceived difference in the mens rea 
elements does n^4- render Shondel, 453 P. 2d at 146, inapplicable. 
mvdL - .L L. ..::.:„ ^ nondel and the proposition that Kent is 
entitled to have her case prooeed under the statute that carries 
the less severe penalty, Shondel,, 453 P. 2a at 14C" v • £11 :i : 1: :i n 
statutes gives accused the benefit of proceeding under the lesser 
of the two penalties); Bryan, 709 P.2d at 257 (if defendant acted 
with the less culpable mental state, lower offense applies). 
Bryan is meant to bolster Kent's Shondel argument. 
C. THE STATE'S "SPECIFIC CONDUCT" ARGUMENT IS UNPERSUASIVE. 
In its final point, the state incorrectly asserts that to 
the extent Kent's conduct may be punishable under the Forgery, 
Insurance Fraud, and Communications Fraud statutes, the state is 
entitled to proceed under the Computer Crimes statute because it 
proscribes specific conduct, while the remaining statutes 
proscribe general conduct. (S.B. at 22.) In support of its 
assertion, the state relies on State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 
1981), which is distinguishable in that context. In addition, the 
state unpersuasively argues that penalizing Kent more harshly 
serves a "rational basis." 
1. State v. Clark Is Inapposite. 
The state relies on Clark, 632 P.2d at 841, to assert that 
the trial court correctly proceeded with this matter under the 
Computer Crimes statute. In that case, defendant argued he should 
be charged with general theft, rather than theft of livestock, 
where he was accused of stealing three turkeys. The general theft 
statute did not state specifically that theft of livestock was 
punishable. Id. at 843 n.3. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court applied 
the specific over the general. Id.; see also Gomez, 722 P.2d at 
74 9-50 (statutes at issue proscribed the same conduct, except 
that harsher statute specified that "signing" of a sales slip in 
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fraudulent use of a credit card was punishable, where more 
lenient status made mere use MI I IMI |IIIIII "habit ' , State v . 
Dure*. |^»|» iy89) '.statutes at issue 
proscribed same conduct, except that harsher statute applied when 
"any prisoner" committ~ .. - -i.i . ; 
when "any person" committ^ a acL> ; State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290 
(Utah 1982) . 
Kent's I'MSP i i lic;l i ihrmjlslidl -1 \\\\ i I L- Lenient, 
general tnett staler- in Cidrk did not specify theft of livestock 
as an offense (Clark, 63 2 P.2d at 84? n.^J , the mo^e lenient 
str,: ' - i- ' .-• iniiij a
 r*\ iini.s I i iuu( specitically 
proscribe use oi a computer .:: the commission of the crime Utah 





 . . . v: - . ; : - . -nrerj oi Liie :cur 
statutes at. issue proscribe the "specific" :onduc: :;af : s, 
use :)f a computer v -,he commission ^' the offense. '. :>, 
3ome~ , ^^.L.^.. UQica,. ..::• .,*-;;••:. , . -..^ tut^ s were silent with 
respect *-•- t. iv "-specific" conduct ct" issue In that context, 
thos^ cases are inapplicab"] ^  In this case, Shonae. r^aui-^-
si i ::arge carrying i-ne lesser penalty. 
Wit;, respect to the Insurance Fraud statute, while .; r^o 
not explicitly penalize us- ^f a computer, • ir a "spec.:.c" 
s 1 • - • • ::a,./.. alleged IJJ Kent's case ^ 
violative of tnat sr.atute. Kent's case is distinguishable from,. 
Clark,, since th^ r^vr4- ":: d not address the ir inflici filial, diiises 
wii-. - -J .-. ... h choosing between, two specific 
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statutes. If the prosecutor chooses to focus on the means used to 
perpetrate the fraud against an insurance claims system, the 
prosecutor will proceed under the Computer Crimes statute, a 
second degree felony. If the prosecutor chooses to focus on the 
victim, the prosecutor will proceed under the Insurance Fraud 
statute, a third degree felony. While the statutes accommodate 
prosecution for like conduct, they do not treat members within 
the class equally. 
Inasmuch as the choice is left to the discretion of the 
prosecutor, under Shondel, Loveless, and Bryan, such a choice is 
arbitrary and standardless, treating a subclass of defendants 
non-uniformly. See also State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 998 (Utah 
1995) (leaving the choice to the prosecutor is unreasonable, 
arbitrary and standardless under state constitution). Since both 
statutes "specifically" target the conduct alleged in the 
Information filed against Kent, the trial court erred in leaving 
the prosecutor with the choice to proceed under the statute 
carrying the harsher penalty. See Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148; 
Loveless, 581 P.2d at 577; Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. 
2. The State's "Reasonable Basis" Argument Is 
Insupportable. 
The state asserts that so long as legislative distinctions 
are not arbitrary, the state may proceed under the statute 
carrying the harsher penalty. (S.B. at 23-24.) The state also 
asserts that so long as there is a rational basis for imposing a 
more severe penalty on Kent for alleged violations of the 
Computer Crimes statute, the state is not required to proceed 
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under one of the fraud-based statutes carrying a lesser penalty. 
(Id.) 
Claik s "" i dtio'iial distinction" analysis does not apply in 
the context or" rh:^ case. There, the court was concerned with a 
genera] citea^^v of crime, and :i ts s 1 :ibcategoi y of speci fi : ! :ii :i n i e s 
._.. ::iier penalty. 
It is no* unconstitutional for a state to impose a more 
severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the 
penalty which is imposed with respect to the general 
category of crimes to which the special crime is related or 
of which it: is a subcategory 
As long as the legislative classifications are not-
arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a general 
and a specific provision of the criminal laws does not 
render the legislation unconstitutional, even though one 
violation is subject to a greater sentence. 
Clark, 632 P.2d at 843-44. In this case, the Court must decide 
whether ; ;- -* • u~ , . lative of other 
specific provisions. It L: :.a\ under Shondei, * rr- trial court 
erred in failing to proceed under the statute carrying * s -^sser 
pe;". v. 
in Lhe event this Court determines it: is required to engage 
in ;:e rational basisydist:neti^n analysis advance , 
K.e* - - . i. tinction L..eLrte^ u tiie other 
fraud-based statutes and the Computer Crimes statute that would 
warrant harsher punishment . - ?- • - o -a+- •- --i--
!•'."• n ^:.~ . ...:-.:: ! is justified 
for the following reason: 
Our society has become increasingly dependent en the use of 
computers. Computers are used to store important data and to 
perform various necessary financial and business functions. 
Like theft of livestock, using a computer to FI-M1 r»r 
defraud is easy to do and extremely difficult to detect. 
Forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud, on the 
other hand, are, because of the nature of their crimes, more 
easily detected. For example, forgery involves writings that 
can be examined and verified. The origins of forged 
documents can almost always be traced. . . Similarly, 
communications fraud requires [an indirect or direct] 
communication to someone, thereby providing a means of 
identifying the person perpetrating the fraud. In contrast, 
a computer crime is essentially a faceless crime. One can 
easily access a computer and steal something of value with 
no one the wiser and with no way to identify the thief. 
(S.B. at 24.) The state's assertion rings hollow for several 
reasons. First, like the Computer Crimes statute, the plain 
language of the Forgery and Communications Fraud statutes 
specifically prohibits use of a computer to perpetrate the fraud. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(2) and 76-10-1801(6)(b). Yet those 
statutes do not contemplate a "harsher penalty" when a computer 
is used in the commission of the offense. By proscribing conduct 
that is already specifically punishable in the Forgery and 
Communications Fraud statutes, the Computer Crimes statute 
creates a conflict, and it renders language in the Forgery and 
Communications Fraud statutes superfluous. It also undermines the 
"purpose" identified by the state for enacting the harsher 
penalty in the Computer Crimes statute. 
Second, with regard to the Insurance Fraud statute, it 
likewise proscribes specific conduct. See Argument A.2., pp. Il-
ls, supra. There is no rational basis for arbitrarily proceeding 
with this matter under the Computer Crimes statute, particularly 
since it carries the harsher penalty. Where there is a choice, 
the state is required to proceed under the statute carrying the 
less severe penalty. 
20 
Third, the state's rationalization for the harsher penalty 
is not supportable. The plain language of the Computer Crimes 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-701, et sec^ _ (1995 and Supp. 1996), 
does not suggest a basis for penalizing a computer crime in the 
context of this case more harshly. In the trial court, the 
prosecutor argued that the legislative history must be examined 
to determine such a basis. (R. 42.) The prosecutor asserted, 
"According to the 1985 legislative history behind the Computer 
Crimes statute, the Legislature passed the bill to address the 
problem of computer hackers accessing computerized systems and 
either damaging the data bases or otherwise committing crimes by 
means of unauthorized access into such systems. Senate Floor 
Debates, 46th Legislature, Jan. 21, 1986, disc 15, counter no. 
14." A copy of the legislative debates relating to enactment of 
the Computer Crimes statute is attached hereto as Addendum A 
("Addendum A"). The "purpose" articulated by the prosecutor does 
not appear there. See Addendum A. 
According to the sponsoring representative and senator, the 
"Computer Crimes Act" was enacted because several cases were 
"reported to the AG's office but [attorneys] weren't able to 
prosecute because we didn't have this bill." Addendum A at 1 and 
7-8. The Act was meant to plug a loophole in crime, not to 
penalize certain defendants more harshly for the commission of 
offenses that already existed. 
Although the legislative history suggests the legislature 
had a legitimate basis for enacting the Computer Crimes statute, 
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the history is silent with regard to the rationale for handing 
out harsher punishments for offenses that already exist. Silence 
should give way to proceeding with such matters under existing 
statutes. 
Fourth, assuming the purpose for enacting the harsher 
penalty was to plug loopholes, the statute in the context of this 
case fails to advance that purpose. Instead of plugging 
loopholes, the statute more harshly penalizes conduct that is 
already made criminal by Utah statute. The harsher penalty for 
existing crimes is not related to plugging loopholes. Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1367 (Utah App. 1993) (statute did not 
substantially advance the legislative purpose, and adversely 
impacted actions unrelated to the problems described by the 
legislature, compelling an order striking it as 
unconstitutional). 
Proceeding under the Computer Crimes Act in this case is 
like charging Kent with, e.g., Communications Fraud and 
arbitrarily enhancing the penalty. The statute was not meant to 
serve as an arbitrary enhancement for existing offenses. The law 
does not support that Kent should be subjected to a greater 
penalty for allegedly violating the Communications Fraud statute. 
Under Utah law, a prosecutor is not entitled to the choice 
of charging under one of two specific statutes, where one statute 
carries a harsher penalty. The defendant is entitled to have the 
case proceed under the charge for the less severe penalty. 
Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148. 
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3. The State Mischaracterizes the "Factual Record." 
Finally, the state argues the "factual record in this case" 
supports proceeding with this matter under the Computer Crimes 
statute. (S.B. at 25-28.) In point of fact, there is no "factual 
record" in this case. The parties proceeded with this appeal in 
accordance with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) . The 
trial court took no evidence and did not conduct a trial. 
Notwithstanding the posture of this appeal, the state 
repeatedly asserts the record "clearly reflects" that Kent "used 
a computer" or "accessed her employer's computer," or otherwise 
engaged in computer functions. More accurately, the Information 
in this case alleges that "On March 17, 1995, FBI Special Agent 
W. Stephen Whittle received information from Leslie Warner of the 
First Health security department, in Salt Lake City, Utah, that 
possible comvuterized fraud had occurred in their insurance claim 
system . . . ." (R. 2-3 (emphasis added).) In addition, for 
purposes of the Sery plea, Kent admitted to using her position 
with First Health to enter the computer system for filing medical 
insurance claims. (R. 47-48.) 
The state asserts that based on the allegations, it is 
unclear if or how Kent allegedly "altered forms" in the 
commission of the fraud. (S.B. at 26.) According to the state, 
because the Information is void of such allegations, the conduct 
cannot be charged as a forgery. "[W]e do not know whether [the] 
alteration resulted in a form that purported to be that of 
another or to be executed at a different time or place." (S.B. 
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at 26.) The state's assertion is irrational. The Information 
reflects that misrepresentations/alterations concerning claims 
purporting to belong to another were executed inducing the 
employer's insurance system to issue checks. The elements for 
forgery are implicitly as well as explicitly alleged in the 
Information. 
The state's argument that "the record facts of this case do 
not meet the elements of insurance fraud" is also misleading. 
The state asserts "nothing in the record of this case indicates 
that defendant made a false representation when she directed the 
computer to issue the two checks." (S.B. at 27. ) 5 If that is 
the case, Kent should not have been charged with violating the 
Computer Crimes statute, since an element of that offense is that 
defendant engaged in the conduct using "false pretenses, pro-
mises, or representations." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3). Again, 
whether Kent is charged with making "false pretenses, promises or 
representations" under the Computer Crimes statute, or false 
representations under the Insurance Fraud statute, for purposes 
of this case the elements are indistinguishable. 
With regard to the Communications Fraud statute, the state 
claims, "nothing in this record indicates that defendant 
actually, either directly or indirectly, communicated, i.e. . • . 
5
 According to Kent's plea agreement, she did not "direct the 
computer to issue the two checks." (S.B. at 27.) Rather, she filed 
medical claims purporting to belong to "Cathleen Gullett" resulting 
in the issuance of checks. (See R. 47-48; S.B. at 27 n.5.) 
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'with any person' as required by the communications fraud 
statute." (S.B. at 28.) Yet the Information alleges that Kent 
made false representations concerning claims reflecting 
entitlement to payment, and that such representations were 
communicated via computer -- according to the state, in order to 
conceal the crime. (S.B. at 24.) The Information supports 
bringing the action under the Forgery statute, the Communications 
Fraud statute or the Insurance Fraud statute. Any other 
interpretation is unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Kent hereby respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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1986 HOUSE DEBATE 
Reading Clerk: Senate Bill 15, Computer Crimes Act, by 
Richard J. Carling. Be it enacted by the 
Legislature of the State of Utah. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Carling? 
Rep. Carling: Yes. Representatives, this Senate Bill 15, 
as you recall, was before us last session and 
was defeated here in this body because of 
problems that we found in the bill. Uh, in 
the interim, we spent quite a bit of time... 
I spent most of the summer with Rob Parrish 
of the Attorney General's office and, uh, 
clarifying the language, cleaning the bill 
up. 
This bill has gone before the interim 
Judiciary Committee, passed unanimously out 
of that committee. Came before the Judiciary 
Standing Committee of this sessions, passed 
unanimously out of that committee. 
Uh, basically the bill, uh, provided criminal 
penalties for people who, without 
authorization, uh, use computers to defraud 
individuals and people. And it also provides 
on the last page that any person who has 
reason to believe that somebody's violated 
the provisions of this act are under 
obligation to report that. Uh, we took 
out...some of the things we took out were, 
uh, things like copying diskettes. We felt 
that since it's already covered by federal 
copyright laws that that wouldn't be 
necessary in our state law to put in this 
bill since it's already covered by federal 
statutes. 
There's a great need for this bill. We've 
had several cases reported to the AG's office 
but weren't able to prosecute because we 
didn't have this bill. So, if there are any 
questions, I'll entertain those questions and 
encourage your vote for the bill. 






Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I rise for the 
purpose of amendment. On page 5, delete 
lines 1 through 4. If I get a second, I'd 
like to speak to that, Mr. Speaker. 
Do you have a second? 
Representatives, uh, we did not have this 
come out of the committee unanimous. I wanna 
make that clear. Uh, I think the bill is a 
good bill and support the bill. But I think 
this last clause goes too far. I think we 
need to understand right now when there's a 
crime committed, a person has the 
responsibility to report that crime. But 
this goes far beyond that. 
This states that every person who has reason 
to believe. Now, I would assume that may 
mean by rumor, that may mean a lot of things. 
That may also mean that if a person who is a 
perpetrator, a criminal, goes to his attorney 
and says, I would like to talk to you, I'm in 
real trouble, what do you suggest I do? That 
attorney then has the obligation to call up 
the Attorney General's office and report. It 
also means if that person goes to his priest 
and report that he has committed an act that 
shouldn't have been committed, that priest 
has that responsibility to report. I only 
know of one other area in all of the statutes 
that we require this and that is under child 
abuse law. And I submit to you that where 
the statute already covers when a crime is 
committed, that we're aware, that we report. 
This is unnecessary. It goes too far. I 
would ask for your support. 
Representative to this amendment? 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I speak against the 
amendment. Do you have any sound? I speak 
against the amendment for a couple of very 
good reasons. The computer industry is a 
closed shop. The only people who know if in 
fact a theft by deception in computer fraud 
has been committed are those within the 
industry. And this last piece of language is 
really intended for those who would commit an 
omission basically, and this is a good bill 
with this in it. 
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I would ask you to defeat the amendment and 
I'd also like to point out a couple of horror 
stories, if I may. In 1980, the CIA 
announced to the rest of the world and the 
other intelligence organizations that they 
had an impenetrable security system on their 
computer. The next day, the Department of 
Naval Intelligence sent them a copy of all of 
the Western hemisphere agents and they did it 
by telephone and interceded their computer. 
The other thing I'd like to relay to you is 
that in 1979 in Boston, Massachusetts, 
Hanover Bank and Trust was raided by 
electronic theft of $10 million bucks that 
they've never recovered. So this is a 
problem, it's a great problem, it's getting 
bigger. And only the people in the business 
know about how it's carried out. And if you 
don't put the language in here requiring 
reporting, because it is a closed community, 
too many of them will practice that sin of 
omission. I think it's a good bill as it is. 
I urge you, defeat the amendment and pass the 
bill. 
Mr. Speaker: Thank you. Representative Free? 
Rep. Free: Thank you. I rise in support of that 
amendment. I think it gets to be a sad thing 
when we start trying to make a shadow society 
to check up on everybody here. That would be 
typical in Russia but not in America. 
And I also call your attention to the fact 
that kids 12 years old are getting so 
computer competent that they can get into 
these things and we don't want, uh, we won't 
want to start, uh, eavesdropping on children. 
Mr. Speaker: Thank you. Representative Cromar? 
Rep. Cromar: Yes. Uh, I'd have to resist the amendment. 
This amendment was proposed in committee, and 
I think Craig Moody was the only one that 
voted for his amendment. Uh, Rob Parrish of 
the AG's office said this [inaudible] needed. 
Also, Rep. Moss pointed out to me that the 
clergy, lawyer-client relationship's already 
covered under the law and would apply here. 
This doesn't exempt that provision as a law. 
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Uh, also, this is...I understand this is in 
our telecommunications product as well. Now 
what would happen if we didn't have this 
provision? The company would take care of 
its dirty wash internally. Several people 
may have been defrauded and we wouldn't be 
able to prosecute. Now the AG's office feels 
this is very important. They said this 
before our committee and, like I said, this 
amendment was already defeated in committee. 
So I urge you to resist the amendment and 
vote for the bill. 
Mr. Speaker: Rep. Moody, we'll turn to you to sum up. 
Rep. Moody: Representatives, the issue here is we've 
already got a statute that requires you to 
report a crime. Nobody has disputed that. 
That is currently status quo. The question 
here is do we include areas right now that 
are not included? 
And for Rep. Cromar's comments, that, uh, 
they're exempted, is not true. We had a bill 
that was passed here three years ago that 
there's a Senate bill coming across right now 
that included the word "everyone." The 
Attorney General's office included that to 
mean attorneys, priests, and across the 
board. And so, I guess, that means if a wife 
suspects her husband, then she too has to 
report him. If that's the way we wanna take, 
and begin that type of a stand on each law, 
then maybe we oughta take that approach. 
But I submit to you there are times when it's 
important to give somebody a right to be able 
to go to somebody and get counsel and advise 
without having that person turn them in to 
the Attorney General. And I think it's a bad 
precedent to be setting by voting and leaving 
this bill...this in the bill and I would ask 
for your support to take it out. Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: The motion is that we bracket all of the 
wording in 76-6-705, that's all of the, uh, 
material on, uh, 5. It's on the screen. All 
those in favor of demotion, say "aye." All 
those opposed? Chair rules that the ayes 
have it. 
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[Inaudible] has been called for. If ten 
representatives will stand. Five 
representatives will stand. We'll be in 
a...voting is now open on the bill, or on the 
motion. [Inaudible] on uh, the motion? 
There are 43 "yes" votes, 10 "no" votes. The 
motion passes. To the bill. How do I tell 
who's who now? I don't see any other lights 
to the bill. Rep. Cromar, we'll move to you 
for sum up. 
Rep. Cromar: Uh, yes. Uh, I wish Rob Parrish were here 
from the AG's office. I think the vote we 
just took was a mistake based on messages 
I've had from them. Whether the Senate 
concurs on this amendment has yet to be seen. 
But I urge you to still support the bill. 
We'll have to go back to the Senate and see 
if they'll concur with this amendment. 
Mr. Speaker: Are we ready to vote? Just...just a moment 
while the, uh, board clears and we'll... 
voting is now open on Senate Bill 15 as 
amendment. 
Voting is closed on Senate Bill 15 as 
amended. Senate Bill 15 as amended, having 
received 62 "yes" votes and no negative 
votes, passes this House and will be returned 
to the Senate for its further action. 
Representative Olsen? 
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1986 SENATE DEBATE 
Secretary: Bill 15, Computer Crimes Act, by Senator 
Richard J. Carling. The [inaudible], 
Mr. President, judiciary to which was 
referred Senate Bill 15, Computer Crimes Act, 
by Senator Carling and others have 
[inaudible] consider this bill [inaudible] to 
that committee with the following amendment, 
page 4, line 13 after "[inaudible] 
investigate and....11 Page 4, lines 11 and 
12, after "general [inaudible]." With the 
assistance of the any and insured or the 






I move we adopt the committee report, 
Those in favor, say "aye". 
[Inaudible] have it again. 
Opposed, "no". 
Senator Carling? 
Mr. President, this was a bill that we 
discussed and passed unanimously last year. 
This is merely a bill [inaudible] between the 
current theft law and the computer law. 
Because of the advance in technology, our 
theft law does not go far enough to, uh, 
protect against computer crimes. The bill 
comes from the Utah Attorney General's 
office, from the Credit Bureau, and other 
people who have problems in securing in the 
computer system. 
The primary change in the bill this year that 
was defeated in the House, uh, last year is 
that we've taken out the provisions that 
would, uh, give the people who innocently, 
uh, copying the computer programs and those 
type of things, such as the kids and, uh, 
looking mainly at computer crimes. The 
Attorney General's office has indicated that 
they're unable to prosecute computer crimes 
under the current law. And, in fact, 
indicated in a letter to me that since last 
year, they've had a case which should've been 
prosecuted but could not be prosecuted 
because of the problem with the 1979 law. 
This is merely to close those loopholes. 
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Mr. President: Senator Overson? 
Sen. Overson: 
Sen. Carling: 
Yes. Urn, Senator Carling, I have to have a 
question here. About the language on 
line 11, page 3, where it says "discloses." 
Now, as I read this, a person who, without 
authorization, gains or attempts to gain 
access and intentionally discloses... now I'm 
reading in the context...and to the damage of 
another, is that included as a person who, 
without authorization, gains or attempts to 
gain access and intentionally, to the damage 
of others, discloses, modifies or such, that 
would be [inaudible--both speaking at once]? 
Yeah, but it's modified by, uh, intentionally 
and to the damage of another. That would be 
if somebody comes in and [inaudible] a credit 
bureau record and tries to sell it to someone 
else. 
Sen. Overson: Okay. How about, uh, somebody who sits down 
at the computer terminal and, uh, he types up 
the code. He works there and the...his good 
buddy sitting next to him and, uh, discloses 
to him the computer program. And that guy 
subsequently uses the information he receives 
from there. Who's...who's gonna be in 
violation? 
Sen. Carling: I imagine the person who intentionally and to 
the damage of the other. Now the other's 
gotta be damages shown. And to the damage of 
the other. If a person's doing it as a 
hobby, this type of thing, uh, I doubt that 
there'd be a problem. But if the way they do 






So, I guess, the...they'd have to prove 
intention and damage rather than the fact 
that they just merely disclosed? 
Right. It has to be [inaudible]. 
Okay. The criminal intent? 
Senator Carling, on page 2, line 13, where 
you deleted the word "property" and put 
"computer property" in there. We're dealing 
with a bill or an act that relates to 
offenses against property, too. Should that 
7 





The Attorney General's office are the ones 
that put these in here and I believe this 
goes to Utah Computer Crimes Act. This is 
not just the property. If you'll take a look 
at page 1, uh, lines 25 and 26. This is the 
[inaudible] was this act shall be known as 
the Utah Computer, uh, Utah Computer Fraud 
Crimes Act. This goes to computers. And so 
this is merely indicating that the Computer 
Fraud Act goes to computer property, not just 
general property. 
[Inaudible]. Now there may be other 
properties involved and it seems to me that 
the definition still should remain property 
rather than computer property alone. 
That was [inaudible] made by the Attorney 
General's office felt that it should say 
computer property. It's 'cause we're not 
dealing with just general property. We're 




I'd be happy, Senator , to check 
with Mr. Parrish and [inaudible] between 
second and third reading. 
[Inaudible conversation] 
Mr. President Any questions? 




Questions been called for and the question 
is, shall Senate Bill 15 pass? 
[Inaudible]. 
[Inaudible] question is, shall Senate Bill 15 
be read for the third time? 
Secretary: 
Mr. President: 
[Reading of names] 
Senate Bill 15 shows 24 "ayes", no "nays", 5 
being absent. Bill passes and will be placed 
on the third reading calendar. 
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